The Importance of Not Studying Theology

Wow. A powerful article from Carl Trueman in the most recent edition of Themelios. He nails the danger in loving the study of the theology rather than theology itself and the God of that theology. This post spoke to me as I find myself saturated in God's Word in biblical languages, semantics, & linguistics and theological vernacular, articulation, and debates. He states,

"The second way in which the study of theology for study’s sake can play out is the manner in which it can ultimately disconnect you from reality, an odd result of studying that should, in theory at least, ground you more firmly in reality than anything else. I often wonder, as I sit in church on a Sunday, of how much of the knowledge I have is truly significant for the people in the pews—the man who has just lost his job, the single mum struggling to hold it together, the teenager coping with all of the pressures that come with the transition to adulthood."

"The answer to such abstraction is not to stop making the study of theology our goal; it is rather to stop making the study of theology our goal. We have a tendency to make the chronological end points—what new things we learn each day—the most important. Yet this confuses the process of learning with the real order of things. The study of theology is not a chase after something or a movement beyond where we start our Christian lives; it is rather a reflection upon the foundations of where we already are. The end term is, strange to tell, the beginning. I start by confessing with my mouth that Jesus is Lord and believing in my heart that God raised him from the dead, and I never actually go any further. All my theology, all my study, is simply reflection on what lies behind that. Thus, I never move beyond praise, never leave behind the beauty of adoration of the living God; I simply learn more and more about the deep foundations upon which that praise and worship rest, which all believers share from the most brilliant to the most humble.

We need to stop studying theology, or, perhaps to put it better, we need at least to stop thinking of what we do as study in the generic sense. It does not move us beyond our starting point; it merely helps us to understand that starting point better."

Read the rest here.

Is Wrath an Attribute of God? Part II

Perhaps it would be even more beneficial to go beyond the Aristotelian distinction and distinguish between God’s essence and attributes (the necessary essentials in contrast to those predicates, though contingent are still attributive). It has been agreed that no element of God is divisible from the host of other characteristics which his being and nature entail. In light of the following statement by Heinrich Heppe, it may seem like theological double-talk to some when distinctions are being made between the attributes. He states, “the divine attributes are not something different from the nature and existence of God, so that the latter may be thought of as distinct from the former. … Rather the attributes of God are the divine nature itself in its relation to the world.”[1]

The danger in categorizing God’s attributes apart from his essence is two-fold. First, there is the temptation to ascribe every attribute to God’s immutable essence and consequently creating a God who is unknowable, unfathomable and ineffable.[2] Such an approach leads to the via negativa where nothing positive can be said of him, but only those characteristics which he is not. Second, some scholars have conceptualized God as one who capriciously utilizes a single quality in each response to his creation. This touches on the discussion of a singular fundamental attribute which was noted earlier as an improper assertion in theology proper. God never acts apart from the wholeness and unity of his very character and nature. “…[T]hese are not to be separated but to be celebrated in their indivisible unity.”[3]

Nevertheless, it still seems helpful to perceive the difference in the characteristics of what the divine nature is in itself and how the divine nature in itself relates to creation. Although the above distinction (essence and attribute) would be an adequate distinction, it seems to be less helpful in that it creates a harder distinction between essence and attributes than the common division of an attribute and property. It is as if attributes derive from his essence whereas properties emanate from his essence – of which his attributes constitute. Therefore, the Aristotelian distinction will be advocated simply because it stresses that attributes are what constitute the essence of God. From this intricate and incomprehensible mak-up we perceive certain properties that derive from his attributes – the essence of God and who he really is.

Now turning the discussion to address the topic at hand, the question surrounds the classification of God’s wrath. Is wrath an attribute of God? Carson states, “… God wrath is not arbitrary but is the willed and principled response (however affective) of his holiness when it confronts the rebellion of his creatures, not least those of his creatures who have entered into covenant with him.”[4] Earlier he remarked, “… as God’s wrath reflects God’s holiness, it is grounded in the very Godness of God.”[5] Wrath seems to be a “reaction of God” rather than a principled fundamental of his Being.[6] It is his response because of his holiness and love.

A danger in not ascribing wrath as an attribute of God is pointed out against those who do not perceive the objective reality of God’s fierce and terrible wrath. Although it is argued in this presentation that wrath should not be qualified as an attribute proper, but as a property, this in no way intends to minimize or diminish the absolute, horrific, objective reality of God’s wrath. Berkhof, Shedd and Reymond all categorize the wrath of God under retributive justice or the infliction of penalties.[7] Again, wrath is a property that is sourced in the goodness (i.e. righteousness) and love of God. Wrath is necessary. But the necessity of God’s wrath is dependent upon the reality of his essential composition and constituent nature.

By not labeling wrath as an attribute does not deny the absolute necessity of divine justice. It simply demonstrates that in eternity past wrath was not necessary in the eternal Trinitarian Godhead, whereas love and holiness have eternally characterized the intrinsic nature of God. Is wrath then an attribute of God? This perspective is persuaded that, no, the wrath of God is not an attribute but a property. This conclusion is based on the definition given above which seems to best handle the Scriptural data and inferences. As Frame has rightly stated, “God’s wrath is nevertheless an outworking of his love.”[8]

---

[1] Heinrich Heppe, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thomson, Reformed Dogmatics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950), 57, quoted in Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995), 40.

[2] Bloesch, God the Almighty, 43. The Bible is replete with anthropomorphic features and personal names of God. YHWH is a noetic God. The Bible’s intention is not to list or categorize the attributes of God. Rather they are comments from historical perspectives which give the readers a mere glimpse into the incomprehensible reality of God – who he is and what he does.

[3] Ibid., 41.

[4] D. A. Carson, ed. Bruce L. McCormack, “The Wrath of God” Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), [37-63], 51. Emphasis original.

[5] Ibid., 49.

[6] Bloesch, God the Almighty, 142.

[7] Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, New Combined Ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), II:75, W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Third Ed. (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2003), 295, Robert L Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, Second Ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 196-197.

[8] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 468. Love displayed in jealousy, results in wrath. Regardless of the discussion as to which fundamental attribute does wrath stem from, may the reader be reminded that it is sourced in the unification of his nature and intrinsic character. Although wrath may be stemmed primarily from his love, goodness, and/or holiness, it is nevertheless grounded in all his necessary attributes.

Is Wrath an Attribute of God? Part I

Such a question compels the responder to describe what is meant by an “attribute.” From there the receiver must determine whether or not wrath is an essential attribute or merely a consequential or derivative attribute (or as Feinberg refers to as an “accidental” predicate).[1] If wrath is simply an accidental predicate is it even legitimate or helpful to refer to it as an attribute? Once an adequate description of an attribute is properly laid out, the responder can then address whether or not wrath can be ascribed to God, let alone be attributed to him.

An attribute will be defined in this presentation as a property that is inherent in one’s essential makeup and constituent nature.[2] Frame explains attributes as those defining qualities that are necessary and therefore intrinsic to someone or something (in the case of this discussion all references are being made to God) and not contingent.[3] In simple terms attributes tell us “who God really and truly is.”[4]

Before further elucidation is presented concerning an attribute let it be stated that one must acknowledge the breadth of the attributive scope. An attribute in a general, all-inclusive sense can be used to describe any property or quality in relation to God. Conversely, an attribute in a limited sense refers to only those predicates that define God’s essence and nature.

For the remainder of this particular discussion, only those qualities that define and constitute the very essence and nature of God will be referred to as attributes. Those predicates that merely describe a Scriptural quality in regards to God’s relational activity will be referred to as properties. Reasons for this will be discussed below. Therefore, this presentation will use key words such as, “essential, defining, natural, and necessary” in relation to God’s attributes. Those words that are key in reference to the properties of God will be referred to as “accidental, contingent, relational, optional, and free.”

Attributes used in the broad and general sense seem to cloud the intention of clarity within this particular discussion. A narrower view of attributes seems to provide a distinction which offers a more helpful solution to the entire laborious discussion concerning how theologians categorize the breadth of God’s attributes. Those familiar with the discussion understand the problems that surround the often-times untidy categorizations of the attributes (communicable and incommunicable, transcendence and immanence, active and passive, etc.).[5]

After moving from Scripture to theology it seems clear that if one decides to label all of God’s Scriptural qualities as attributes, than he cannot grant that all attributes are of equal consequence. Because some thing can be attributed to God, such an attributive thing does not necessitate it to be inherent to one’s essential makeup and constituent nature. So who decides which attributes are more intrinsic to God’s nature? Who determines that not all the attributes are equal? In God’s eternally self-existent state did wrath, grace, and mercy constitute his essential being? Since this broad application attribute lends to confusion, the limited and narrow description of an “attribute” seems to be the most helpful definition.

John Feinberg initially defines an attribute in the broad sense. He states, “In speaking of someone’s or something’s attributes, we refer to the characteristics or qualities that express their nature.”[6] Yet he realizes the issues surrounding the broad sense of the word, and so he too turns to the above Aristotelian distinction of the essential and accidental qualities. Feinberg’s conclusion is that those narrowed qualities are the “permanent attributes of God’s very being.”[7] He remarks that they “… are the subject of our discussion of the divine attributes.”[8]

Yet even Feinberg seems to disregard his own distinction between attributes and properties. For example, he lists grace, mercy, and lovingkindness as moral “attributes.” From his statements, “All three members of the Godhead ... are characterized as gracious” and “God is a God of grace” Feinberg concludes that grace constitutes as an attribute of God. The issue arises when he seemingly blurs the distinction when he states, “when we understand this fact [that grace is never owed or earned] about grace, we see how good and loving our God is to grant us grace.”[9] Similarly, in regards to mercy he remarks, “… of course it is an expression of God’s love and goodness.”[10] Then why refer to it as an attribute and not a property?

Wayne Grudem even concedes that although grace, mercy, and patience can be understood as separate attributes of God, they can also be understood as particular examples or relational contingencies within the realm of God’s goodness.[11] Such a concession reveals a seeming distinction or “hierarchy” per se in which not all the “attributes” (as Grudem sees them) appear to hold the same weight.

The concern is that everything in this world in some way, shape or form expresses God’s nature. It is inescapable. Thus, to define all characteristics and qualities as attributes seems unhelpful, because while everything in the world somehow relates to God, not everything is intrinsic to his being. Although the Scriptures never present a list of God’s attributes but rather appeal to a characteristic of God as the foundational source of his relational activity, it can be deduced from one’s movement from Scripture to theology vis-à-vis legitimate and logical interpretation that certain qualities are sourced in the very essence and nature of God. Therefore, it seems advantageous to distinguish between the attributes and properties of God, and not to refer to all of his qualities as attributes.

Negatively, an attribute is something that is non-optional and non-essential. Positively, an attribute is that which is necessary and defining. In addition, attributes pertaining to God never stand alone or are singled out. There is not one fundamental attribute of God that stands as the essence from which all the other attributes derive. Rather the necessary attributes of God coalesce and relate to all the other defining attributes, and from those essential attributes the properties of God find their derivation.

---

[1] John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 234.

[2] John Frame’s depiction of an attribute is as follows: “Attributes are the predicates, properties, or qualities ascribed to a substance. Those that define its nature constitute its essence. Others are accidents, which are properties that are not part of the essence and therefore are not necessary to its being” (The Doctrine of God, (Phillipsburg, P&R, 2002), 221), emphasis original.

[3] Ibid., 387.

[4] Ibid., 387.

[5] Thus, when defining the attributes of God the theologian must begin in Scripture, commit to solid exegesis, formulate legitimate hermeneutical premises, conceptualize arguments, test conclusions, all the while examining the logic in the formulation, deduction, implications, and inferences.

[6] Feinberg, No One Like Him, 233.

[7] Ibid., 235.

[8] Ibid., 235.

[9] Ibid., 354.

[10] Ibid., 359.

[11] Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 200.