Perhaps it would be even more beneficial to go beyond the Aristotelian distinction and distinguish between God’s essence and attributes (the necessary essentials in contrast to those predicates, though contingent are still attributive). It has been agreed that no element of God is divisible from the host of other characteristics which his being and nature entail. In light of the following statement by Heinrich Heppe, it may seem like theological double-talk to some when distinctions are being made between the attributes. He states, “the divine attributes are not something different from the nature and existence of God, so that the latter may be thought of as distinct from the former. … Rather the attributes of God are the divine nature itself in its relation to the world.”[1]
The danger in categorizing God’s attributes apart from his essence is two-fold. First, there is the temptation to ascribe every attribute to God’s immutable essence and consequently creating a God who is unknowable, unfathomable and ineffable.[2] Such an approach leads to the via negativa where nothing positive can be said of him, but only those characteristics which he is not. Second, some scholars have conceptualized God as one who capriciously utilizes a single quality in each response to his creation. This touches on the discussion of a singular fundamental attribute which was noted earlier as an improper assertion in theology proper. God never acts apart from the wholeness and unity of his very character and nature. “…[T]hese are not to be separated but to be celebrated in their indivisible unity.”[3]
Nevertheless, it still seems helpful to perceive the difference in the characteristics of what the divine nature is in itself and how the divine nature in itself relates to creation. Although the above distinction (essence and attribute) would be an adequate distinction, it seems to be less helpful in that it creates a harder distinction between essence and attributes than the common division of an attribute and property. It is as if attributes derive from his essence whereas properties emanate from his essence – of which his attributes constitute. Therefore, the Aristotelian distinction will be advocated simply because it stresses that attributes are what constitute the essence of God. From this intricate and incomprehensible mak-up we perceive certain properties that derive from his attributes – the essence of God and who he really is.
Now turning the discussion to address the topic at hand, the question surrounds the classification of God’s wrath. Is wrath an attribute of God? Carson states, “… God wrath is not arbitrary but is the willed and principled response (however affective) of his holiness when it confronts the rebellion of his creatures, not least those of his creatures who have entered into covenant with him.”[4] Earlier he remarked, “… as God’s wrath reflects God’s holiness, it is grounded in the very Godness of God.”[5] Wrath seems to be a “reaction of God” rather than a principled fundamental of his Being.[6] It is his response because of his holiness and love.
A danger in not ascribing wrath as an attribute of God is pointed out against those who do not perceive the objective reality of God’s fierce and terrible wrath. Although it is argued in this presentation that wrath should not be qualified as an attribute proper, but as a property, this in no way intends to minimize or diminish the absolute, horrific, objective reality of God’s wrath. Berkhof, Shedd and Reymond all categorize the wrath of God under retributive justice or the infliction of penalties.[7] Again, wrath is a property that is sourced in the goodness (i.e. righteousness) and love of God. Wrath is necessary. But the necessity of God’s wrath is dependent upon the reality of his essential composition and constituent nature.
By not labeling wrath as an attribute does not deny the absolute necessity of divine justice. It simply demonstrates that in eternity past wrath was not necessary in the eternal Trinitarian Godhead, whereas love and holiness have eternally characterized the intrinsic nature of God. Is wrath then an attribute of God? This perspective is persuaded that, no, the wrath of God is not an attribute but a property. This conclusion is based on the definition given above which seems to best handle the Scriptural data and inferences. As Frame has rightly stated, “God’s wrath is nevertheless an outworking of his love.”[8]
[1] Heinrich Heppe, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thomson, Reformed Dogmatics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950), 57, quoted in Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995), 40.
[2] Bloesch, God the Almighty, 43. The Bible is replete with anthropomorphic features and personal names of God. YHWH is a noetic God. The Bible’s intention is not to list or categorize the attributes of God. Rather they are comments from historical perspectives which give the readers a mere glimpse into the incomprehensible reality of God – who he is and what he does.
[4] D. A. Carson, ed. Bruce L. McCormack, “The Wrath of God” Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), [37-63], 51. Emphasis original.
[7] Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, New Combined Ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), II:75, W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Third Ed. (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2003), 295, Robert L Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, Second Ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 196-197.
[8] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 468. Love displayed in jealousy, results in wrath. Regardless of the discussion as to which fundamental attribute does wrath stem from, may the reader be reminded that it is sourced in the unification of his nature and intrinsic character. Although wrath may be stemmed primarily from his love, goodness, and/or holiness, it is nevertheless grounded in all his necessary attributes.
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