Is Wrath an Attribute of God? Part I

Such a question compels the responder to describe what is meant by an “attribute.” From there the receiver must determine whether or not wrath is an essential attribute or merely a consequential or derivative attribute (or as Feinberg refers to as an “accidental” predicate).[1] If wrath is simply an accidental predicate is it even legitimate or helpful to refer to it as an attribute? Once an adequate description of an attribute is properly laid out, the responder can then address whether or not wrath can be ascribed to God, let alone be attributed to him.

An attribute will be defined in this presentation as a property that is inherent in one’s essential makeup and constituent nature.[2] Frame explains attributes as those defining qualities that are necessary and therefore intrinsic to someone or something (in the case of this discussion all references are being made to God) and not contingent.[3] In simple terms attributes tell us “who God really and truly is.”[4]

Before further elucidation is presented concerning an attribute let it be stated that one must acknowledge the breadth of the attributive scope. An attribute in a general, all-inclusive sense can be used to describe any property or quality in relation to God. Conversely, an attribute in a limited sense refers to only those predicates that define God’s essence and nature.

For the remainder of this particular discussion, only those qualities that define and constitute the very essence and nature of God will be referred to as attributes. Those predicates that merely describe a Scriptural quality in regards to God’s relational activity will be referred to as properties. Reasons for this will be discussed below. Therefore, this presentation will use key words such as, “essential, defining, natural, and necessary” in relation to God’s attributes. Those words that are key in reference to the properties of God will be referred to as “accidental, contingent, relational, optional, and free.”

Attributes used in the broad and general sense seem to cloud the intention of clarity within this particular discussion. A narrower view of attributes seems to provide a distinction which offers a more helpful solution to the entire laborious discussion concerning how theologians categorize the breadth of God’s attributes. Those familiar with the discussion understand the problems that surround the often-times untidy categorizations of the attributes (communicable and incommunicable, transcendence and immanence, active and passive, etc.).[5]

After moving from Scripture to theology it seems clear that if one decides to label all of God’s Scriptural qualities as attributes, than he cannot grant that all attributes are of equal consequence. Because some thing can be attributed to God, such an attributive thing does not necessitate it to be inherent to one’s essential makeup and constituent nature. So who decides which attributes are more intrinsic to God’s nature? Who determines that not all the attributes are equal? In God’s eternally self-existent state did wrath, grace, and mercy constitute his essential being? Since this broad application attribute lends to confusion, the limited and narrow description of an “attribute” seems to be the most helpful definition.

John Feinberg initially defines an attribute in the broad sense. He states, “In speaking of someone’s or something’s attributes, we refer to the characteristics or qualities that express their nature.”[6] Yet he realizes the issues surrounding the broad sense of the word, and so he too turns to the above Aristotelian distinction of the essential and accidental qualities. Feinberg’s conclusion is that those narrowed qualities are the “permanent attributes of God’s very being.”[7] He remarks that they “… are the subject of our discussion of the divine attributes.”[8]

Yet even Feinberg seems to disregard his own distinction between attributes and properties. For example, he lists grace, mercy, and lovingkindness as moral “attributes.” From his statements, “All three members of the Godhead ... are characterized as gracious” and “God is a God of grace” Feinberg concludes that grace constitutes as an attribute of God. The issue arises when he seemingly blurs the distinction when he states, “when we understand this fact [that grace is never owed or earned] about grace, we see how good and loving our God is to grant us grace.”[9] Similarly, in regards to mercy he remarks, “… of course it is an expression of God’s love and goodness.”[10] Then why refer to it as an attribute and not a property?

Wayne Grudem even concedes that although grace, mercy, and patience can be understood as separate attributes of God, they can also be understood as particular examples or relational contingencies within the realm of God’s goodness.[11] Such a concession reveals a seeming distinction or “hierarchy” per se in which not all the “attributes” (as Grudem sees them) appear to hold the same weight.

The concern is that everything in this world in some way, shape or form expresses God’s nature. It is inescapable. Thus, to define all characteristics and qualities as attributes seems unhelpful, because while everything in the world somehow relates to God, not everything is intrinsic to his being. Although the Scriptures never present a list of God’s attributes but rather appeal to a characteristic of God as the foundational source of his relational activity, it can be deduced from one’s movement from Scripture to theology vis-à-vis legitimate and logical interpretation that certain qualities are sourced in the very essence and nature of God. Therefore, it seems advantageous to distinguish between the attributes and properties of God, and not to refer to all of his qualities as attributes.

Negatively, an attribute is something that is non-optional and non-essential. Positively, an attribute is that which is necessary and defining. In addition, attributes pertaining to God never stand alone or are singled out. There is not one fundamental attribute of God that stands as the essence from which all the other attributes derive. Rather the necessary attributes of God coalesce and relate to all the other defining attributes, and from those essential attributes the properties of God find their derivation.

---

[1] John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 234.

[2] John Frame’s depiction of an attribute is as follows: “Attributes are the predicates, properties, or qualities ascribed to a substance. Those that define its nature constitute its essence. Others are accidents, which are properties that are not part of the essence and therefore are not necessary to its being” (The Doctrine of God, (Phillipsburg, P&R, 2002), 221), emphasis original.

[3] Ibid., 387.

[4] Ibid., 387.

[5] Thus, when defining the attributes of God the theologian must begin in Scripture, commit to solid exegesis, formulate legitimate hermeneutical premises, conceptualize arguments, test conclusions, all the while examining the logic in the formulation, deduction, implications, and inferences.

[6] Feinberg, No One Like Him, 233.

[7] Ibid., 235.

[8] Ibid., 235.

[9] Ibid., 354.

[10] Ibid., 359.

[11] Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 200.