Frame's Review of Horton's "Christless Christianity"

John Frame writes a very critical review of Mike Horton's, Christless Christianity. His conclusion:

I usually don’t review books at this length. But I have noticed that the theology of this book is becoming more influential in evangelical and Reformed circles, and I believe there is danger in that. I say that despite the fact that I agree with the book about many things. Most relevantly, I agree with Horton that the evangelical church needs to put more emphasis on man’s sin and the saving grace of Christ, less emphasis on what Horton regards as other things and what I regard as the lower-priority applications of Christ’s work. But he thinks this wrong emphasis is so bad as to put the church in immediate danger of Christless apostasy. I do not.

Horton’s alarmism is persuasive to many people, and I have been moved to try to show them their persuasion is premature. The problem is that the yardstick Horton uses to measure the American church’s allegiance to Christ is not an accurate yardstick. Or, to drop the metaphor, Horton measures the American church with a defective theology.

He comes on to the reader as a generic Protestant Christian with a passion for the historic doctrines of the atonement and of justification by faith alone. He writes engagingly. Naturally, then, other Protestants tend to resonate to his arguments. But Horton is not just a generic Protestant or even a generic Reformed theologian. He holds certain positions that are not warranted by the Reformed Confessions and which in my mind are not even Scriptural. To review, he advocates the following:

1. Attention to ourselves necessarily detracts from attention to Christ.

2. We should not give attention to the way we communicate the gospel, or to making it relevant to its hearers.

3. God’s sovereignty and human responsibility are a zero-sum game. The idea that man must do something compromises the absolute sovereignty of God.

4. God’s work of salvation is completely objective, external to us, and not at all subjective, internal to us. (Here he backtracks some.)

5. God promises us no earthly blessings, only heavenly ones, and to desire earthly blessings is a “theology of glory,” deserving condemnation.

6. Law and gospel should be utterly separate. There should be no good news in the bad news and no bad news in the good news.

7. Preaching of the gospel must never use biblical characters as moral or spiritual examples. Nor must it address practical ethical issues in the Christian life.

8. A focus on redemption excludes a focus on anything else.

9. In worship and in the general ministry of the church, God gives and does not receive; the congregation receives and does not give.

10. Analysts of the church must compare the Church’s focus on Christ with its focus on other things, rather than considering that many of these other things are in fact applications of Christ’s own person and work.

Horton considers adherence to these principles essential, so that departing from them constitutes Christlessness, and failure to emphasize them sufficiently leads to a false gospel. But not one of these principles is found in any Reformed confession. (#6 is found in the Lutheran confessions, but it is controversial among other Protestants.) And in my view, none of them are Scriptural.

So Christless Christianity is essentially an evaluation of the American church, not from the standpoint of a generic Protestant theology, but from what I must regard as a narrow, factional, even sectarian perspective. Readers need to understand this. If we remove #1-10 as measuring sticks for the American church, the church does not look nearly as bad as Horton presents it.

There is great danger here of further division within the body of Christ, as if there were not already enough. Arguments over redemptive-historical preaching (#7) have already split congregations apart. When one group presents these principles as the only orthodox position, but others (understandably) are not convinced, and the principles themselves are often unclear, we have a recipe for disaster.

And the church would do well, in my judgment, not to add principles 1-10 to its creed. The results could include intentional irrelevance (1-2), especially on social matters (5, 7, 8), Christian passivity (3, 9), intellectualism and impersonalism in our relation to God (4, 9), artificiality in preaching, not drawing on the richness of Scripture (2, 6-8), elimination of lay ministry (9), and poor theological analyses and evaluations of the church (10).

So I must render a negative verdict on this book, though commending the author’s passion for the purity of the church and for the gospel. In doing this, I must disagree with many friends and respected colleagues, who have commended this volume lavishly. They should have known better.

HT: Z

Is Wrath an Attribute of God? Part II

Perhaps it would be even more beneficial to go beyond the Aristotelian distinction and distinguish between God’s essence and attributes (the necessary essentials in contrast to those predicates, though contingent are still attributive). It has been agreed that no element of God is divisible from the host of other characteristics which his being and nature entail. In light of the following statement by Heinrich Heppe, it may seem like theological double-talk to some when distinctions are being made between the attributes. He states, “the divine attributes are not something different from the nature and existence of God, so that the latter may be thought of as distinct from the former. … Rather the attributes of God are the divine nature itself in its relation to the world.”[1]

The danger in categorizing God’s attributes apart from his essence is two-fold. First, there is the temptation to ascribe every attribute to God’s immutable essence and consequently creating a God who is unknowable, unfathomable and ineffable.[2] Such an approach leads to the via negativa where nothing positive can be said of him, but only those characteristics which he is not. Second, some scholars have conceptualized God as one who capriciously utilizes a single quality in each response to his creation. This touches on the discussion of a singular fundamental attribute which was noted earlier as an improper assertion in theology proper. God never acts apart from the wholeness and unity of his very character and nature. “…[T]hese are not to be separated but to be celebrated in their indivisible unity.”[3]

Nevertheless, it still seems helpful to perceive the difference in the characteristics of what the divine nature is in itself and how the divine nature in itself relates to creation. Although the above distinction (essence and attribute) would be an adequate distinction, it seems to be less helpful in that it creates a harder distinction between essence and attributes than the common division of an attribute and property. It is as if attributes derive from his essence whereas properties emanate from his essence – of which his attributes constitute. Therefore, the Aristotelian distinction will be advocated simply because it stresses that attributes are what constitute the essence of God. From this intricate and incomprehensible mak-up we perceive certain properties that derive from his attributes – the essence of God and who he really is.

Now turning the discussion to address the topic at hand, the question surrounds the classification of God’s wrath. Is wrath an attribute of God? Carson states, “… God wrath is not arbitrary but is the willed and principled response (however affective) of his holiness when it confronts the rebellion of his creatures, not least those of his creatures who have entered into covenant with him.”[4] Earlier he remarked, “… as God’s wrath reflects God’s holiness, it is grounded in the very Godness of God.”[5] Wrath seems to be a “reaction of God” rather than a principled fundamental of his Being.[6] It is his response because of his holiness and love.

A danger in not ascribing wrath as an attribute of God is pointed out against those who do not perceive the objective reality of God’s fierce and terrible wrath. Although it is argued in this presentation that wrath should not be qualified as an attribute proper, but as a property, this in no way intends to minimize or diminish the absolute, horrific, objective reality of God’s wrath. Berkhof, Shedd and Reymond all categorize the wrath of God under retributive justice or the infliction of penalties.[7] Again, wrath is a property that is sourced in the goodness (i.e. righteousness) and love of God. Wrath is necessary. But the necessity of God’s wrath is dependent upon the reality of his essential composition and constituent nature.

By not labeling wrath as an attribute does not deny the absolute necessity of divine justice. It simply demonstrates that in eternity past wrath was not necessary in the eternal Trinitarian Godhead, whereas love and holiness have eternally characterized the intrinsic nature of God. Is wrath then an attribute of God? This perspective is persuaded that, no, the wrath of God is not an attribute but a property. This conclusion is based on the definition given above which seems to best handle the Scriptural data and inferences. As Frame has rightly stated, “God’s wrath is nevertheless an outworking of his love.”[8]

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[1] Heinrich Heppe, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thomson, Reformed Dogmatics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950), 57, quoted in Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995), 40.

[2] Bloesch, God the Almighty, 43. The Bible is replete with anthropomorphic features and personal names of God. YHWH is a noetic God. The Bible’s intention is not to list or categorize the attributes of God. Rather they are comments from historical perspectives which give the readers a mere glimpse into the incomprehensible reality of God – who he is and what he does.

[3] Ibid., 41.

[4] D. A. Carson, ed. Bruce L. McCormack, “The Wrath of God” Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), [37-63], 51. Emphasis original.

[5] Ibid., 49.

[6] Bloesch, God the Almighty, 142.

[7] Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, New Combined Ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), II:75, W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Third Ed. (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2003), 295, Robert L Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, Second Ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 196-197.

[8] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 468. Love displayed in jealousy, results in wrath. Regardless of the discussion as to which fundamental attribute does wrath stem from, may the reader be reminded that it is sourced in the unification of his nature and intrinsic character. Although wrath may be stemmed primarily from his love, goodness, and/or holiness, it is nevertheless grounded in all his necessary attributes.

Is Wrath an Attribute of God? Part I

Such a question compels the responder to describe what is meant by an “attribute.” From there the receiver must determine whether or not wrath is an essential attribute or merely a consequential or derivative attribute (or as Feinberg refers to as an “accidental” predicate).[1] If wrath is simply an accidental predicate is it even legitimate or helpful to refer to it as an attribute? Once an adequate description of an attribute is properly laid out, the responder can then address whether or not wrath can be ascribed to God, let alone be attributed to him.

An attribute will be defined in this presentation as a property that is inherent in one’s essential makeup and constituent nature.[2] Frame explains attributes as those defining qualities that are necessary and therefore intrinsic to someone or something (in the case of this discussion all references are being made to God) and not contingent.[3] In simple terms attributes tell us “who God really and truly is.”[4]

Before further elucidation is presented concerning an attribute let it be stated that one must acknowledge the breadth of the attributive scope. An attribute in a general, all-inclusive sense can be used to describe any property or quality in relation to God. Conversely, an attribute in a limited sense refers to only those predicates that define God’s essence and nature.

For the remainder of this particular discussion, only those qualities that define and constitute the very essence and nature of God will be referred to as attributes. Those predicates that merely describe a Scriptural quality in regards to God’s relational activity will be referred to as properties. Reasons for this will be discussed below. Therefore, this presentation will use key words such as, “essential, defining, natural, and necessary” in relation to God’s attributes. Those words that are key in reference to the properties of God will be referred to as “accidental, contingent, relational, optional, and free.”

Attributes used in the broad and general sense seem to cloud the intention of clarity within this particular discussion. A narrower view of attributes seems to provide a distinction which offers a more helpful solution to the entire laborious discussion concerning how theologians categorize the breadth of God’s attributes. Those familiar with the discussion understand the problems that surround the often-times untidy categorizations of the attributes (communicable and incommunicable, transcendence and immanence, active and passive, etc.).[5]

After moving from Scripture to theology it seems clear that if one decides to label all of God’s Scriptural qualities as attributes, than he cannot grant that all attributes are of equal consequence. Because some thing can be attributed to God, such an attributive thing does not necessitate it to be inherent to one’s essential makeup and constituent nature. So who decides which attributes are more intrinsic to God’s nature? Who determines that not all the attributes are equal? In God’s eternally self-existent state did wrath, grace, and mercy constitute his essential being? Since this broad application attribute lends to confusion, the limited and narrow description of an “attribute” seems to be the most helpful definition.

John Feinberg initially defines an attribute in the broad sense. He states, “In speaking of someone’s or something’s attributes, we refer to the characteristics or qualities that express their nature.”[6] Yet he realizes the issues surrounding the broad sense of the word, and so he too turns to the above Aristotelian distinction of the essential and accidental qualities. Feinberg’s conclusion is that those narrowed qualities are the “permanent attributes of God’s very being.”[7] He remarks that they “… are the subject of our discussion of the divine attributes.”[8]

Yet even Feinberg seems to disregard his own distinction between attributes and properties. For example, he lists grace, mercy, and lovingkindness as moral “attributes.” From his statements, “All three members of the Godhead ... are characterized as gracious” and “God is a God of grace” Feinberg concludes that grace constitutes as an attribute of God. The issue arises when he seemingly blurs the distinction when he states, “when we understand this fact [that grace is never owed or earned] about grace, we see how good and loving our God is to grant us grace.”[9] Similarly, in regards to mercy he remarks, “… of course it is an expression of God’s love and goodness.”[10] Then why refer to it as an attribute and not a property?

Wayne Grudem even concedes that although grace, mercy, and patience can be understood as separate attributes of God, they can also be understood as particular examples or relational contingencies within the realm of God’s goodness.[11] Such a concession reveals a seeming distinction or “hierarchy” per se in which not all the “attributes” (as Grudem sees them) appear to hold the same weight.

The concern is that everything in this world in some way, shape or form expresses God’s nature. It is inescapable. Thus, to define all characteristics and qualities as attributes seems unhelpful, because while everything in the world somehow relates to God, not everything is intrinsic to his being. Although the Scriptures never present a list of God’s attributes but rather appeal to a characteristic of God as the foundational source of his relational activity, it can be deduced from one’s movement from Scripture to theology vis-à-vis legitimate and logical interpretation that certain qualities are sourced in the very essence and nature of God. Therefore, it seems advantageous to distinguish between the attributes and properties of God, and not to refer to all of his qualities as attributes.

Negatively, an attribute is something that is non-optional and non-essential. Positively, an attribute is that which is necessary and defining. In addition, attributes pertaining to God never stand alone or are singled out. There is not one fundamental attribute of God that stands as the essence from which all the other attributes derive. Rather the necessary attributes of God coalesce and relate to all the other defining attributes, and from those essential attributes the properties of God find their derivation.

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[1] John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 234.

[2] John Frame’s depiction of an attribute is as follows: “Attributes are the predicates, properties, or qualities ascribed to a substance. Those that define its nature constitute its essence. Others are accidents, which are properties that are not part of the essence and therefore are not necessary to its being” (The Doctrine of God, (Phillipsburg, P&R, 2002), 221), emphasis original.

[3] Ibid., 387.

[4] Ibid., 387.

[5] Thus, when defining the attributes of God the theologian must begin in Scripture, commit to solid exegesis, formulate legitimate hermeneutical premises, conceptualize arguments, test conclusions, all the while examining the logic in the formulation, deduction, implications, and inferences.

[6] Feinberg, No One Like Him, 233.

[7] Ibid., 235.

[8] Ibid., 235.

[9] Ibid., 354.

[10] Ibid., 359.

[11] Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 200.